~~SECRET~~ SECRET No. 1374

TO: Chiefs of Certain Bases and Stations
INFO: Senior War Planners
SR/Domestic Operations Base

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

FROM: KUCAGE Staff

DATE: 19 MAY 1959

SUBJECT:
General: PARAMILITARY
Specific: 1st Document: E&E Concepts & Doctrine
2nd Document: [illegible]

RE: "43-3" (CHECK "X" ONE)
- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: System

REFERENCES:

1. The subject papers, approved by Chief, KUCAGE, are forwarded as a basis of reference for the indicated Chiefs of Stations and Bases and Senior War Planners to assist in planning coordination and implementation of KUBARK responsibilities in the field of Evasion and Escape, as set forth in the OSD/ARA-KUBARK Delineation of Responsibilities. These documents represent the latest doctrines and operational Evasion and Escape activities or in other [illegible] of operations which may have Evasion and Escape potential.

2. It is anticipated that these papers will be supplemented by additional doctrines and techniques on various aspects of Escape and Evasion, which will also be designed to amplify understanding of this entire field.

3. These documents should not be removed from the Stations or Bases premises. Storage and reading should take place within the Stations and Bases.

[illegible]

Attachments: 2

FORM 51b (1-57) USE PREVIOUS EDITION, REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-29A AND 51-30 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

SECRET

CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

S-E-C-R-E-T

COMMENTS

C/SR/DOB ✓

SR/DOB/COP

Message Center

(1) Case Officer(s) [ ] I'm ready & believe we [illegible] should get going on this Bat

(2) TRAINING [ ]

Admin & Finance

Logistics

Security

Do 1 + 2 -
Suggest you read the attached & see how we can best incorporate the E+E nuclei concept into the AEDEPOT program - Please have your comments ready for discussion with DOB/COP Training/DOB and C/SR/DOB

Thanx
Mike

(2) This appears to coincide with the general consensus that the AEDEPOT Training concept must OR SHOULD embrace major changes. Suggest that all the new concepts be resolved soonest. [ ]

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

COMMENTS

CSR/DOB

SR/DOB/COP

Message Center [ ]

(1) Case Officer(s) FOR AEDEPOT Jules [ ]

SA&E

Training

SSO & Finance

Logistics

Security

S-E-C-R-E-T

BOOK DISPATCH NO 1174

ATTACHMENT # 1

GUIDANCE ON EVASION AND ESCAPE CONCEPTS

SUBJECT: Guidance on Evasion and Escape Concepts.

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to offer guidance for the establishment of clandestine E&E facilities during the cold war for use during hot war or cold war contingencies. It is intended that this information be utilized by KUBARK headquarters elements in planning, preparation and support for operational activities in the E&E field.

2. KUBARK DEVELOPMENT OF E&E CONCEPTS AND FACILITIES

A. GENERAL

DEFINITION: Evasion and Escape, according to the ODEARL-KUBARK Deliniation of Responsibilities for E&E is "that field of unconventional warfare action in support of military tactics and strategy which involves the procedures and operations whereby PBPRIME and Allied military personnel and other selected individuals are able to emerge from an enemy-held or unfriendly areas to areas under Allied control. Recovery and rescue operations from other than enemy-held areas are not considered to be included in this definition."

In addition, KUBARK has a unilateral requirement for a cold war capability for extricating and exfiltrating specific individuals from local control in certain areas. The personnel may be PBPRIME citizens or foreign individuals in which the PBPRIME has interest; the area involved may be specifically hostile, or one in which the current political climate is inimical to the best interests of PBPRIME.

(1) It is recognized, therefore, that the Evasion and Escape field includes KUBARK and Military cold and hot war requirements. The need for a practical approach to the diverse problems in this field has become increasingly clear with the extensive cold war commitments of the PBPRIME. In the event of general or limited warfare, or a contingency situation PBPRIME citizens, military, or civilian, may be subject to enemy capture or forced to undertake evasion through hostile areas. The partial or full commitment of PBPRIME air or ground forces in such a situation would further increase the potential value of already developed E&E facilities. Therefore, KUBARK planning and development of E&E facilities has been moving toward the establishment of those mechanisms or capabilities which have utility in all types of war or contingency situations, in direct support of PBPRIME policy.

(2) KUBARK and ODEARL coordination and planning have been slow inasmuch as military data on overflight routes, air-strike targets, potential radiation fall-out and requirements for air support, logistics lift and personnel infiltration-exfiltration have been either changing or indefinite. It may be said, however, that conditions which have limited the exchange of such necessary information are being alleviated, and the future promises certain progress.

B. COLD WAR DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF E&E FACILITIES

(1) E&E NUCLEI

Experience has indicated that the most practical approach to meeting KUBARK's responsibilities in cold war development of E&E assets for hot war or emergency utilization lies in creation of clandestine E&E nuclei. These nuclei should consist of one or a few indigenous agents, well-trained in E&E concepts, and techiques, who are "in place" and have a good potential for "stability" in their area. Such nuclei should be specifically trained in spotting and assessing of additional personnel to be utilized during a hot war to supplement the E&E facility. In addtion, E&E nuclei should have the potential for operational use of the nuclei themselves if such expansion is impossible. In this regard it is recognized that in many parts of the world it may be possible to develop and utilize only the nuclei themselves.

The development of cold war E&E nuclei also appears to meet general operational problems with certain advantages over development of the complete or "classic" clandestine E&E nets.

a. Security problems in creation and maintenance of nuclei are less than in those of a larger organization inasmuch as fewer personnel are involved and closer control should be possible.

b. Development and maintenance of operational techniques are more practically accomplished with a nucleus for the same reasons. Motivation can be more readily maintained.

c. Nuclei may be operationally employed during cold war periods in secondary tasks, such as intelligence reporting, with relatively good security.

It is therefore recommended that inevery area where E&E requirements exist or may be anticipated, i.e. where enemy over-run or hostile seizure of an area is probable in event of war or local contingency, efforts be continued or be initiated in developing these basic E&E nuclei elements.

(2) COLD WAR OPERATIONS IN E&E

KUBARK has undertaken development of doctrine and techniques for the cold war role in support of PBPRIME national policy through extrication of selected individuals from certain areas. This phase of the E&E field has received impetus because of the many coups and revolutions which have taken place during the past two years, and due to which personnel in whom PBPRIME has an interest have been imprisoned or are detained under undesirable local control.

C. HOT WAR E&E CONCEPTS

Among the major considerations which confront KUBARK in planning and development of E&E is determination as to the type of indigenous facility which is most applicable for wartime use in the various areas likely to be involved.

(1) It has been generally recognized that the complete, or classic , clandestine E&E net is the most useful, if it is possible to create and maintain such an organization. However, the number of assets necessary to operate a mechanism of this nature, and the attendant time, financial and security problems, offer a potential for varied and serious difficulties in the development and implementation of the calssic net. In the optimum, the classic net includes elements for:

a. Contact, holding, and identification of the evader or contact;

b. Capability for movement of the evader;

c. Facilities for ultimate evacuation or recovery of the evader;

d. Communications.

Nets of the classic type have been developed successfully under wartime conditions in areas where, generally, there is reasonably heavy population density, where well-developed transport and communications facilities exist, and where a significant percentage of the population in the enemy-occupied country is, or has been, pro-west in their attitude or political orientation. In this regard, success has been achieved in the establishment of such classic facilities during the cold war period in such areas as described above

(2) The second E&E concept for wartime application is that which utilized the limited E&E facility. This is, in fact, the implementation of the of the E&E nucleus which was developed during the cold war period and which could not be expanded to the complete net due to local security obstacles or other reasons. The limited E&E facility is applicable in many parts of the world where population centers are more widely scattered, where cocio-economic factors are, perhaps, less developed or where only a minor percentage of population of the hostile area may have been considered pro-west in their attitudes. Limited E&E facilities may be operated with one or a few persons and are, of course, usually restricted in potential or capability. The limited facility may exist as one or more segments of the classic net; for example, it may consist only of a contact-holding facility; have a partial or complete capability for movement of evaders; or, perhaps have a recovery or evacuation potential. In other cases the limited facility may offer only

assistance or border-crossing or air or sea reception-evacuation. In order to assure optimum security for the indigenous element in such limited E&E facilities a basic capability should exist for holding and identifying an evader prior to his being offered the limited capabilities in movement or evacuation which may exist.

(3) A third concept in hot war E&E is the extension of the cold war capability for infiltration-exfiltration operations for the purpose of gaining access and offering assistance to PBPRIME or Allied POW, or other selected persons, to effect their escape from hostile detention.

(4) One aspect of the E&E field deserving or particular attention is that of the supplementary E&E mechanism. Undoubtedly some E&E facilities will be developed in conjunction with, be incorporated into, or supplementary to, larger resistance elements, guerrilla forces or the like. In such cases the E&E facilities will not exist as an individual mechanism but will be subject to the primary objectives of the larger organization. For example, it may be necessary for such E&E elements to hold evaders for protracted periods of time prior to making efforts for the evader's evacuation. There is also the probability that evaders being held under such circumstances will be required to involve themselves actively in the pursuits of the resistance group rather than passively accepting the "hospitality" and holding facilities of this group. It may be necessary also to effect the movement of the evader to refuge or evacuation points which are far removed from the areas of operation of the resistance group so as to afford as much security as possible for this latter element as well as for the supplementary E&E mechanism.

3. The difficulties of establishing Staybehind elements of the nature set forth herein are fully realized. However, inasmuch as KUBARK is officially committed to the operational development and implementation of such staybehind facilities it is desired that appropriate priority be given thereto. In this regard, it is strongly recommended that careful consideration be given to the possible supplementary cold-war use of which such facilities may be put in current intelligence reporting, area assessment for wartime use of landing zones, drop zones, infiltration/exfiltration areas, etc., in order to further justify maintenance of such long range assets.

4. The ODEARL-KUBARK Agreement on the Delineation of Responsibilities for the field of E&E previously mentioned in Para 2A above, has been in effect since August, 1957. This document is presently under revision and when final agreement thereon is reached the addressees of thim memorandum will be advised of the results.

5. KUCAGE will be available to offer any further assistance or guidance on the foregoing matters, in general or in specific, as the need may be.

BOOK DISPATCH NO 1174

ATTACHMENT # 2

GUIDANCE ON CONCEPTS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EVASION AND ESCAPE FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM

SUBJECT: Guidance on Concepts and Implementation of the Evasion and Escape Fingerprint Identification System.

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to offer guidance on the concepts, development and requirements of the Evasion and Escape Fingerprint Identification System, (EEFIS). It is intended that this information be utilized by KUBARK headquarters and field elements in planning, preparation and support for operational activities in the E&E field.

2. THE EVASION AND ESCAPE FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (EEFIS)

One of the most important aspects of the E&E field, applicable to many aspects of unconventional warfare and/or paramilitary activities, is the requirement for a capability of positive identification by KUBARK controlled or influenced indigenous elements of evaders or unknown contacts.

The EEFIS was developed by KUBARK in coordination with PBPRIME Military Services, in specific response to a requirement accepted by KUBARK within the official KUBARK-Military Delineation of Responsibilities for Evasion and Escape. The abbreviated form, "EEFIS" has been utilized in referring to the system. The Delineation of Responsibility for the E&E field specifies that KUBARK "is responsible, in coordination with the Military, for development of systems to enable verification of identity by clandestine mechanisms of evaders and escapers." The EEFIS completed in 1958, is the result of KUBARK fulfillment of this responsibility.

The system, as it has been developed, provides a method for rapid and positive identification of PBPRIME military and other selected personnel, by PBPRIME controlled or influenced indigenous elements in hostile areas, normally utilizing radio for transmission of the identifying data. A major objective in the creation of this system was to reduce the possibility of enemy penetration and compromise of these staybehind elements.

During development of the system it was determined that the EEFIS was generally applicable to a majority of KUBARK operations in that it offers a positive security factor not hitherto existant in contacts between assets not known to one another. This aspect is being developed in another guidance paper which will incorporate the more comprehensive potential of the system.

A. SCOPE OF THE EEFIS

(1) The EEFIS is based on the fingerprint identification principles utilized by ODENVY although the EEFIS is somewhat more simple than the procedures of ODENVY.

(2) The system affords KUBARK controlled or influenced, EEFIS-trained E&E nets, nuclei or other assets as appropriate, the capability for positive identification of E&E evaders and other selected personnel, who present themselves to such elements for assistance. The system has a potential for application throughout the entire clandestine field in as much as it may be utilized by KUBARK controlled or influenced assets, for the identification of the following classes of personnel in periods of cold or hot war:

a. PBPRIME civilians or other persons whose fingerprints are on file with ODENVY , evading capture in hostile areas;

b. PBPRIME military personnel evading capture in hostile areas;

c. KUBARK indigenous assets;

d. Mutual identification of PBPRIME; or PBPRIME directed, personnel infiltrating into hostile areas for purposes of contact with PBPRIME directed or influenced resistance elements, guerrilla elements, etc.

e. Allied military or civilian personnel. (Specific agreement thereon have not been reached with any Ally and modification of the system may be necessary to meet Allied requirements.)

(3) The system is based on the principle that the KUBARK indigenous element with whom the person to be identified makes contact , will take the fingerprints of all fingers, both hands, of the unknown person, classifying two of the fingerprints in detail, the remainder in gerneral, according to the prescribed method within the KUBARK EEFIS manual. The encoded description is then forwaredto KUBARK headquarters for verification.

(4) The system, while retaining the capability of a positive identification, includes sufficient latitude to meet difficulties which may arise through fault of the indigenous fingerprinter, or partial losses in the communications. In cases where the degree of error is sufficient to cause serious concern as to the bona fides of the fingerprinted person, arrangements are in existance whereby supplementary interrogation, based on the individual's personnel file, may offer additional assurance of identity.

B. KUBARK-MILITARY COORDINATION

KUBARK by letter dated 10 July 1958, advised JBTRUTH that the doctrine and planning for the system has been completed and that KUBARK was planning to undertake implementation and coordination of the system throughout its designated facilities. By letter of 10 October 1958, JBTRUTH advised KUBARK of the PBPRIME Military Services approval of the system and agreed to the delineation of responsibilities for the implementation thereof.

ODUNIT, as executive agency for JBTRUTH on E&E matters, was designated to coordinate the system within the Military Services. It is to be especially noted, therefore, that KUBARK is committed to the implementation of the system as a KUBARK responsibility in the E&E field, and the creation of capabilities for utilization of the system in all applicable activities is mandatory.

Specific responsibilities for coordination of the system were allocated, by the agreement, as follows:

KUBARK RESPONSIBILITIES

(1) Over-all coordination of the EEFIS program.

a. Maintenance of liaison with ODEARL and other PBPRIME Government Departments and Agencies including ODENVY for implementation of the system;

b. Development of liaison with appropriate Allied services for purposes of modifying the system to meet Allied requirements and capabilities.

(2) Training:

a. of KUBARK operators;

b. of selected military personnel, as may be mutually agreed upon at a later date.

MILITARY RESPONSIBILITIES

(1) ODUNIT, as the JBTRUTH executive agent for matters pertaining to E&E will coordinate the program among the Military Services.

(2) Development of methods for improvement of military fingerprinting of military personnel with the objective of reducing the percentage of inadequate military fingerprints submitted to ODENVY.

(3) Training and briefing of military personnel.

(4) Furnishing of personal data to KUBARK as required to facilitate identification and verification procedures in instances where the fingerprint information transmitted by by the indigenous element is incomplete or inadequate.

(5) Commanders of Commands established by JBTRUTH will be responsible for:

a. In coordination with KUBARK, the peacetime planning training, conduct of excercises, and testing to ensure the establishment of the system;

b. Wartime extension of peacetime responsibilities and control and administration of the system within the appropriate areas of responsibilities.

C. EFFIS OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

KUBARK will implement the EEFIS by training of indigenous assets within KUBARK's appropriate facilities. The operational procedures for wartime or contingency use of the system will be as follows:

(1) ASSUMPTIONS:

a. Existence of KUBARK controlled/influenced facilities trained in the EEFIS.

b. Existence of a condition of hot war or a contihgency in which evasion by PBPRIME or other selected personnel, is necessary to avoid capture in hostile territory and in which persons may contact KUBARK assets for assistance.

(2) PROCEDURES:

a. The EEFIS trained elements, prior to offering the person or evader more than immediate assistance of of a survival nature, i.e. subsistance, medical care as available , safe holding areas, etc., will take the fingerprints of the individual. If, in the case of PBPRIME military evaders, several persons, such as an aircrew or a combat patrol, make contact as a group with such staybehind facility, the indigenous element may require the fingerprints of only one or two members of the group, PROVIDING ALL MEMBERS OF THE GROUP ARE POSITIVELY AND PERSONALLY KNOWN TO ONE ANOTHER AS PBPRIME PERSONNEL.

b. The indigenous element will classify the fingerprints according to the prescribed techniques of the system, encode the classification, transmit the coded message through appropriate clandestine channels to the KUBARK field station or base or, in cases where military elements are involved in E&E and use of the EEFIS to the military theater E&E center. In all cases, whether the identification data is sent from the clandestine element to a KUBARK base/station, or to the military theater E& E center, the data is finally forwarededto KUBARK headquarters. At KUBARK headquarters, KUCAGE, in conjunction with ODENVY and ODEARL will verify the identity of the person finger-printed. KUBARK will transmit results of the headquarters authentication, lack therof, or further requirements thereon, to the field station or theater E&E center, from which the reply will be transmitted to the indigenous or military element. Assuming, for example, that the identity of the evader has been authenticated, the indigenous element will

then accept the individual as bona fide and one in whom they may place trust and offer all assistance possible. The E&E element will endeavor to effect the ultimate recovery of the evader through use of secure holding and movement elements, or other E&E capability. In instances where positive identification is desired of two previously unknown contacting elements, i.e., an agent infiltrating to a resistance element, the EEFIS may be utilized to assure the appropriate party that he or they are contacting the correct personnel. In all instances, indigenous elements, when transmitting the encoded fingerprint data, will follow the form prescribed in the KUBARK training manual, Headquarters, in response to such messages, will follow the form also prescribed in the training manual.

3. KUBARK IMPLEMENTATION OF EEFIS

A. COORDINATION

KUCAGE as the coordinating element for KUBARK E&E activities will coordinate KUCAGE administrative and operational implementation of the EEFIS as well as liaison with the PBPRIME Military Services on this subject, Individual attention will be given by KUCAGE to general and particular operational problems in the implementation and maintenance of the system in order to effect efficient and comprehensive coor coordination. KUBARK field coordination will be effected through the Chiefs of Stations and, as appropriate, the Senior War Planners.

B. OPERATIONAL COORDINATION

Pursuant to the foregoing, global implementation of the EEFIS will require training in the system and planning for its use by all KUBARK indigenous assets in E&E or other appropriate activities, including externally held assets, for use thereof in hot war or contingencies. Therefore, it will be necessary to assess projects for the purpose of ascertaining the potentials for use of EEFIS that may exist, present or future. KUBARK operational elements should make specific note of the additional potential use of the system as set forth in Paragraph 2C(4) and 3C(2)e.

4. TRAINING PLANS FOR EEFIS

It is the intention of KUBARK that all appropriate field stations and bases have sufficient personnel qualified in the EEFIS to carry out and maintain the training and proficiency of the program among the necessary indiginous assets.

A. TIME REQUIREMENTS FOR TRAINING

(1) Staff Employee and Staff Agent Personnel

KUROAR has indicated that a qualified Staff employee or Staff agent instructor may be trained within a period of three to five days. These same Staff instructors, in the field, will be responsible under the Chief of Station, for the training of appropriate indigenous personnel int the use of EEFIS.

(2) Indigenous Agent Personnel

The training time of indigenous personnel will vary, depending on the aptitude of the indigenous student, the language facility of the student and/or instructor, and the security factors in existance, i.e., training opportunities under appropriate cover, etc. Under normal circumstances it is anticipated that five days should be sufficient for thorough training of an indiginous agent.

B. KUBARK CAREER PERSONNEL TRAINING PLAN

There are some trained KUBARK personnel in various areas in the field, capable of initiating implementation of the EEFIS. In addition, training is available for KUBARK personnel going to the field for assignment to operational activities in which the system can be utilized. It is anticipated that within approximately two years, KUBARK will have a capability for full implementation of the EEFIS in the field and among appropriate indiginous elements. Headquarters will be responsible for maintaining continuity of this aspect of the program, and assuring that all appropriate field elements have qualified personnel available. It will be the responsibility of the area divisions to insure that such replacement personnel are afforded the opportunity for the EEFIS training.

C. INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL TRAINING

It will be the responsibility of each area division to effect appropriate use of the EEFIS-Trained Staff personnel in the field to achieve training of indigenous personnel involved in E&E programs or appropriate activities in various areas. It is necessary that implementation of this program proceed as quickly as possible and be maintained in order to effect a continuous and realistic "in place" capability for utilization of this system.

D. TRAINING AIDS

It is anticipated the revised EEFIS manual and agent "guides" (abbreviated plastic reference cards) will be in the hands of the area divisions and other appropriate KUBARK elements by March 1959. This new manual makes no basic change in the system except that the description of the fingerprinted person has been reduced to name, nationality, military service and military service number only. The new manual will offer improved fingerprint examples and increased clarity in explanation of techniques of the system, the e- by making more simple the tasks of the indigenous agent.

(1) TRAINING AIDS IN FOREIGN LANGUAGES

The area divisions will receive the EEFIS training manual printed in English. The area divisions have indicated that the agent "guides" are desired in the following languages: French; Dutch; Italian; Norwegian; Swedish; Danish; Finnish German; Czechoslovakian; Hungarian; Polish; Greek; Turkish; Urdu; Kurdish; Arabic; Pharsi; Armenian; Afghani; Egyptian; Burmese;

Karen; Kachin; Mandarin; Indonesian (Malay); Japanese Korean (Hankul); Tagalog; Thai; Vietnamese.

The area divisions will be furnished with master copies of the initial headquarters translations for the "guides", which should be sent to the field to ascertain correctness of the translation with the local vernaculars. KUCAGE will coordinate with the area divisions in cases where the desired translations are not feasible at headquarters. In such instances it will be necessary to accomplish the translation in the field, The area divisions will be expected to inform KUCAGE as to the correctness and acceptibility of the translation, or to furnish a substitute translation from the field, at which time final production of the "guides" will be undertaken by headquarters. It is recommended, in all cases of checking the translation in the field or field production of the translation, the indigenous personnel involved be trained in the EEFIS to assure an accurate check or comprehensive translation. It is anticipated that the production of the "guides" by headquarters, in the numbers desired by the area divisions, will be achieved by 1 July 1959.

5. MILITARY USE OF EEFIS

In general, PBPRIME Military personnel will not be trained in the techniques of the system. However, it is stipulated in the KUCAGE Military agreement on the EEFIS that it may become necessary for KUBARK to undertake training of appropriate military personnel. It is anticipated that only key military personnel will be so trained and that they will represent units which are expected to become involved in the actual wartime development of E&E facilities in hostile areas, i.e., the OBIDEX Special Forces elements, etc. Training of key personnel will be undertaken by KUBARK when appropriate agreement has been reached between this organization and the Military Services and coordination will be accomplished by KUBARK headquarters. The communications channels for use of the EEFIS within wartime military-developed E&E facilities will be from the covert or military E&E element in the field to the KUBARK representative on the theater E&E center and thence to the KUBARK headquarters where identification action will be effected. The headquarters reply will be transmitted to the field via the same communications channels.

In addition to the foregoing it is advantageous to offer the Military Services information on the EEFIS for use as briefing material for potential evaders. Such data will assist in pointing out what might be expected should military personnel be forced to evade the enemy in hostile territory and be fortunate enough to contact PBPRIME controlled or influenced clandestine facility. Such information will be forwarede to the military within the near future and will include:

A. General information on the system and its operation, lines of communication, headquarters identification procedures;

B. Responsibilities of the evader, once he has contacted and accepted assistance of the E&E facility; the possibility of the evader having to wait , for some time, accomplishment of the identification procedures, and the assurance of sound security offered by the system.

6. ALLIED USE OF THE EEFIS

KUBARK efforts to achieve acceptance of use of the EEFIS by FCMERCER within their clandestine E&E facilities have progressed slowly. However, certain Allied services have endorsed and encouraged the use of the system in identification of their own as well as PBPRIME personnel. At the outset, it should be realized that no other country in the world has the fingerprint identification program and facilities which exist in PBPRIME, (ODENVY). It is possible that before the fiscal year (1959) is over KUBARK will have completed a "single fingerprint system: for presentation to appropriate Allies. KUBARK elements are required to obtain headquarters approval prior to incorporating the EEFIS in Allied or bilateral activities.

7. ALTERNATE METHODS OF E&E IDENTIFICATION

There has been an extensive history of efforts, successful and otherwise, for the development of other means of mutual identification of evaser and indigenous friendly elements. Under today's political conditions there is increased concern over making a wrong contact by either the evader or indigenous element. The EEFIS has proven to be the most effective method of identification in this field, However, under conditions of extensive warfare, there will be conditions and areas in which EEFIS cannot be incorporated into friendly E&E elements, presently existing or those which may emerge or form. To meet such circumstances, KUBARK is undertaking coordination of additional E&E identification systems in order to meet all possible exigencies which may arise. Such additonal systems will include the use of codes, signs. symbols, exchange of talismen, interrogation of the evader on physical or biographical factors,etc. It is recognized that these systems would be utilized, generally, on an ad hoc and changing basis, as has been the case in the past. They may also be applicable even in cases where the fingerprint system is in operation. In these latter cases it is anticipated that an E&E facility using EEFIS as a basic identification system may well accept, temporarily, and hold personnel using supplementary identification systems, such as those mentioned above. However, it is expected that such E&E facilities would also employ the EEFIS, supplementing the regular EEFIS transmission with the fact that another identification method has been used and requesting advice of the higher authority for confirmation of the supplementary system. As in all cases of pending identity-verification, the E&E facilities will be forced to hold the evader outside the critical elements of the facility until identification is achieved.

9. The present ODEARL-KUBARK Agreement on the Delineation of Responsibilities for the field of E&E previously mentioned in paragrpah 2 above, has been in effect since August, 1957. This document is presently under revision and when final agreement thereon is reached, the addressees of this memorandum will be advised of the results.

10. The KUCAGE Staff anticipates dissemination of further information doctrines and techniques pertaining to the field of Evasion and Escape as such developments occur.